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“In the best of Chinese traditions, generations of overseas Chinese never forget their home 
country, their origins, or the blood of the Chinese nation flowing in their veins” (Xi Jinping, 
2014: 69) 
 
It is often argued that the territoriality of China’s ancient empire was flexible and defined along 
cultural lines. The Middle Kingdom was constructed not only through conquest and suzerainty 
but also through cultural practices that enabled Chinese scholars to draw and claim the “borders 
of Chinese civilization” (Howland, 1996). Things changed in the 19th and 20th centuries as the 
sovereignty of the Chinese state adapted to external demands and became infused with 
nationalist rationales. However, civilizational myths and ambitions held sway, and have 
permeated the social construction of the country’s “imagined community” up to our present day. 
Today, the People’s Republic of China positions itself as a guardian of Westphalian sovereignty 
and a proponent of a problematical norm of inter-national “non-interference” (Gonzalez-
Vicente, 2015). Yet the prevalence of differentiated “zoning technologies” within the PRC (Ong, 
2004), the “graded rings of sovereignty” employed to claim and flexibly manage Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan (Sow, 2013), and the resolve to annex the South China Sea indicate that 
issues of territoriality and sovereignty are not as settled or discrete as the official discourse may 
suggest. At the same time, Chinese ethno-nationalism remains marred by a racial essentialism 
that portrays “the Han as a pure biological entity” (Dikötter, 2015, p. 78), and that inevitably 
precludes many of those who inhabit within China’s variegated borders from belonging to the 
imagined community.  
 
In this piece I argue that these understandings of the postcolonial nation, operating against a 
backdrop of rising economic and political power, have translated in a series of alarming 
interventions that I characterize as ‘extraterritorial racial sovereignty’. This form of sovereignty 
draws upon an assemblage of imperial, civilizational and racist understandings of 
“Chineseness”1, and has been mobilized by the Chinese government to intervene beyond state 
borders. Crucially, racial sovereignty is espoused with geographical markers and notions such 
as that of a “Greater China” and with ideas of a cultural and diasporic identity that ostensibly 
dissociate the nation from territory. However, these ideas have been operationalized by the state 
in order to circumvent territorial constraints and expand its disciplinary power, hence producing 
new forms of state spatiality that assist in the consolidation of territorial claims and the policing 
of dissent. Whereas the idea of “Greater China” – which includes in most interpretations the 
PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore and overseas Chinese communities – is best 
understood as a contingent and ambiguous discourse (Callahan 2004), the Chinese government 
has in recent times used it as an actual site of intervention, ultimately projecting an ambition to 
operate both in a territorially discrete realm and an extraterritorial and racially-bounded 
dimension. Three examples are used to illustrate this trend: the abduction in Thailand and Hong 
Kong of book publishers critical of the Chinese government; the extradition of Taiwanese 
citizens from Kenya to China; and the Chinese government’s claim to protect Malaysian 
citizens of Chinese descent.  
 
The first of these cases has gathered significant attention, as the disappearance of the 
booksellers signaled an escalation in China’s recent campaign against dissent. A total of five 
                                                   
1 There is a distinction in Chinese language between “zhongguoren” (中国人– a Chinese national) and 
“huaren” (华人– a person of Chinese ethnicity). This editorial focuses on the PRC’s intent to govern over 
non-Chinese citizens of Chinese descent. 
publishers of gossipy books about Chinese leaders vanished to later reappear in the custody of 
PRC authorities confessing to a series of crimes that were unrelated to their publishing activities. 
Foreign media, rights groups and close relatives took such confessions with skepticism, 
suggesting that they had likely been forced and staged (The Guardian, 2016a). Most prominent 
were the cases of Gui Minhai, a Swedish citizen, and Lee Bo, British. Gui disappeared in 
Thailand, while Lee was abducted in Hong Kong, both beyond the jurisdiction of PRC law 
enforcers. What is remarkable about these cases is how PRC authorities justified – while not 
openly acknowledging – the extraterritorial detentions of non-Chinese nationals. China’s 
Foreign Minister contended that Lee’s Chinese descent and the fact that he resided in Hong 
Kong made him “first and foremost a Chinese citizen” (South China Morning Post, 2016). Soon 
after his detention, Lee appeared on China’s Phoenix TV to express his intention to give up 
British citizenship. In an almost synchronized move, Gui published a letter where he requested 
the Swedish government not to intervene in his case, claiming he truly felt Chinese and “[his] 
roots [were] still in China” (Reuters, 2016). Both declarations, coming from mouth and pen of 
long-time dissidents, seemed to project the Chinese government’s notion of citizenship rather 
than the identity or interests of the detainees. 
 
The second case involves not just racial paradigms but also geopolitical motivations – which 
can in turn be analyzed against the backdrop of race. Adhering to its longstanding “One China” 
policy and seeking to make a stance after the electoral victory of Taiwan’s pro-independence 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the PRC government accepted the deportation of eight 
Taiwanese citizens from Kenya to China following a case of phone-frauds in early 2016. As 
Taiwanese authorities protested vividly, China’s official media denounced the DPP and 
proclaimed that “it is indisputable, both in law and in the One China policy, that the Chinese 
mainland can extradite the eight Taiwanese involved in the fraud charges” (Global Times, 2016). 
The case needs to be framed within the PRC’s quest for “reunification” of “Greater China” – 
both controversial concepts in that they infer inexorability, as well as racial, cultural, economic 
and ultimately political unity (Harding, 1993). Race has been a pillar of Chinese nationalism 
since Sun Yat-sen’s proposition for a nation-race built on the force of “common blood” and 
lineage (Dikötter, 1996). The racial foundations of the imagined nation engender a geopolitical 
construct (ie. “Greater China”) that transcends existing territorial borders. Yet while racial 
essentialism has been prominent throughout China’s modern history, the actual implementation 
of race-based forms of extraterritorial sovereignty is a more recent affair that reflects the 
advance of assertive nationalism under the leadership of Xi Jinping.  
 
The “manufactured (…) myth of shared descent”, traced back to the Yellow Emperor and the 
Peking Man (Leibold, 2006, p. 211), features prominently in contemporary nationalist 
discourses. This is illustrated in the way in which Chinese diplomats have recently invoked the 
association between the Chinese state and the broader “Chinese family” across the world. A 
rather innocuous but revealing example is that of China’s Consul General in San Francisco, 
Luo Linquan, who speaking to an audience of children adopted by American parents in 
December 2015 reminded them that their “black eyes, black hair and dark skin” were all signs 
of Chineseness, and exhorted them to “develop the Chinese spirit [they] were born with” (China 
Daily, 2015). A more explicit discourse of extraterritorial sovereignty can be appreciated in the 
declarations of China’s ambassador in Malaysia, Huang Huikang. Responding to anti-Chinese 
protests in Kuala Lumpur’s Chinatown, Huang warned that China would “not sit by idly” if the 
rights of ethnic Chinese were to be violated, despite the fact that most inhabitants of Chinatown 
are today Malaysian citizens (The Economist, 2015). Here it is important to note how ethnic 
Chinese in Southeast Asia are conceived in the dominant imagination in China as “huaqiao” 
(华侨 – overseas Chinese), literally expounding them as part of China’s diasporic nation and 
as ‘bridges’ (qiao) to assist with the country’s economic and civilizational ambitions. In this 
way, imagined biological ties produce a distinct architecture of state power that is to some 
extent delinked from territory and which ultimately legitimizes intervention. 
 
In setting an agenda for the research of actual practices of extraterritorial racial sovereignty in 
China’s international relations, I suggest to explore whether two distinct notions of “empire” 
open a useful path for analysis. The first of these notions is that of “empire” as a pre-modern 
mode of political organization in China. This is a pre-national empire, one where the European 
idea of “bounded communities” with marked (and mapped) territoriality was not yet overtly 
present (Anand, 2009). Common intellectual references, clan and lineage, everyday rituals and 
cultural norms delimited the non-territorial borders of the empire, whereas a sophisticated 
bureaucratic structure was key in political organization (Spence, 1990, pp. 10-11). Official 
narratives in contemporary China echo this rather idealized imperial past. The very ideas of 
lineage and shared history seem to be very much alive in the minds of the China’s new leaders. 
On this count, Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” does not suggest a complete departure from a 
backward past, as Mao once did, but instead builds upon the idea of a shared lineage to urge 
“the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation” to achieve “the rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation […], the greatest dream of the Chinese people since the advent of modern times” (Xi, 
2014, p. 38).  
 
The deterritorialization of state power is in turn inspired by the revival of pre-national concepts 
such as “Tianxia” (天下  – All-under-Heaven), revisited by Chinese scholars to claim a 
vernacular contribution to world-making based on notions of hierarchy, harmony, order and the 
“uniformity of society” (Zhao, 2011, p. 26). While the idea of “Tianxia” evokes universality, it 
is also deeply civilizational. The term in its original use referred only to the “Chinese world” 
ruled by an emperor or “Tianzi” (天子 – Son of Heaven). Yet in its cosmopolitan aspirations, it 
is presented as an ordering rational without which we are condemned to living in a “disordered 
world of chaos (…) [a world that] is not yet a world, but is still a nonworld” (ibid, p. 33). Such 
ethno-cultural narratives and myths legitimize intervention not only as a matter of territorial 
security but also as a civilizational imperative. This suggests that, beyond the modern racial, 
national and territorial rationales that began to take hold in 19th century China, one can explore 
deeper into the genealogy of Chinese political thought to understand how extraterritorial racial 
sovereignty is thought, justified, and put in practice nowadays (see Callahan 2008 for a critique 
of Chinese visions of world order).  
 
A promising way to do so is to explore how China, as a “postcolonial informal empire”, 
selectively appropriates “ideas and technologies such as sovereignty and nationalism” – and 
also pre-modern ones – to justify the deployment of center-periphery relations within its borders 
(Anand, 2012, p. 68), but also to expand its ethnocentric civilizational enterprise beyond 
territorial boundaries. This perspective also allows us to probe into the messy and utilitarian 
combination of vernacular rationales of political organization with practices that could be better 
analyzed from the perspective of “empire” in the modern European sense. Contemporary forms 
of imperialism legitimize extraterritorial intervention as a matter of internal and global security 
for markets or the citizens of a given country. China’s emerging extraterritorial sovereignty 
combines notions of non-territorial racial citizenship with contemporary logics of territorial 
integrity and securitization, although Chinese interventions are aimed not only at securitizing 
but also at disciplining the imagined community. The question of race is central to the 
articulation of ‘citizenship’ in contemporary China, as one can clearly observe in Hong Kong’s 
policies for naturalization, which overtly privilege individuals of Chinese descent, and hence 
delineates the parameters of extraterritorial intervention. In effect, three distinct forms of 
citizenship overlap each other: legal citizenship, a sense of lineage and biological belonging, 
and a territorially encompassing form of domination that allows to incorporate Tibetans and 
Uighurs to a multiethnic national project, albeit on unequal terms. The combination of these 
three distinct ordering rationales, based on pre-modern and modern understandings of political 
organization, justify in turn interventions to securitize the legal, racial and territorial nation. 
 
China’s increasingly assertive racial discourse and the de-linking of territory and state 
citizenship from sovereignty challenge not only political geography theorizing, but also 
existing structures of state power in Asia and beyond. As China’s economic and military power 
rise through the 21st century, ethnic-Chinese populations across the world may feel growing 
pressures to remain loyal to the Chinese government’s centralized vision of a unitary “China 
Dream”. The governments of other countries may concede to the nationalist ambitions of China 
and disregard international law or their responsibilities towards their citizens, as the active role 
of the Kenyan government in the case of Taiwanese deportations or the timid response of 
Britain in Lee Bo’s case seem to indicate. It remains uncertain whether these discourses and 
interventions will intensify with time, but China’s emerging practices of extraterritorial racial 
sovereignty are relevant today, and could reveal much about the country’s future role in regional 
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